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Abstract
Black holes are extremely relativistic objects. Physical processes around them
occur in a regime where the gravitational field is extremely intense. Under such con-
ditions, our representations of space, time, gravity, and thermodynamics are pushed
to their limits. In such a situation philosophical issues naturally arise. In this chapter
I review some philosophical questions related to black holes. In particular, the rele-
vance of black holes for the metaphysical dispute between presentists and eternalists,
the origin of the second law of thermadynamics and its relation to black holes, the
problem of information, black holes and hypercomputing, the nature of determinsim,
and the breakdown of predictability in black hole space-times. I maintain that black
hole physics can be used to illuminate some important problems in the border between
science and philosophy, either epistemology and ontology.
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1. The philosophical importance of black holes
Black holes are the most extreme objects known in the universe. Our representations
of physical laws reach their limits in them. The strange phenomena that occur around
black holes put to the test our basic conceptions of space, time, determinism, irre-
versibility, information, and causality. It is then not surprising that the investigation
of black holes has philosophical impact in areas as diverse as ontology, epistemology,
and theory construction. In black holes, in a very definite sense, we can say that phi-
losophy meets experiment. But, alas, philosophers have almost paid no attention to
the problems raised by the existence of black holes in the real world (for a notable
and solitary exception see Weingard 1979; a recent discussion of some ontological
implications of black holes ca be found in Romero & Pe´rez 2014).
The purpose of this chapter is to palliate this omission and to provide a survey
of some important philosophical issues related to black holes. I do not purport to
deliver an exhaustive study; such a task would demand a whole book devoted to the
topic. Rather, I would like to set path for future research, calling the attention to some
specific problems.
In the next section I introduce the concept of a black hole. I do this from a space-
time point of view, without connection to Newtonian analogies. Black holes are not
black stars; they are fully relativistic objects and can be understood only from a rela-
tivistic perspective. Hence, I start saying a few things about space-time and relativity.
In the remaining sections of the chapter I present and discuss several philosophical
issues raised by the existence and properties of black holes. In particular, I discuss
what happens with determinism and predictability in black holes space-times, the im-
plications of the existence of black holes for ontological views of time and the nature
of reality, the role of black holes in the irreversibility we observe in the universe, is-
sues related to information and whether it can be destroyed in black holes, the apparent
breakdown of causality inside black holes, and, finally, the role played, if any, by black
holes in the future of the universe.
2. What is a black hole?
A black hole is a region of space-time, so I start introducing the concept of space-time
(Minkowski 1908).
Definition. Space-time is the emergent of the ontological composition of all events.
Events can be considered as primitives or can be derived from things as changes
in their properties if things are taken as ontologically prior. Both representations are
equivalent since things can be construed as bundles of events (Romero 2013b). Since
composition is not a formal operation but an ontological one1, space-time is neither
a concept nor an abstraction, but an emergent entity. As any entity, space-time can
be represented by a concept. The usual representation of space-time is given by a
4-dimensional real manifold E equipped with a metric field gab:
ST=ˆ 〈E, gab〉 .
It is important to stress that space-time is not a manifold (i.e. a mathematical
construct) but the “totality” of events. A specific model of space-time requires the
1For instance, a human body is composed of cells, but is not just a mere collection of cells since it has
emergent properties and specific functions far more complex than those of the individual components.
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specification of the source of the metric field. This is done through another field,
called the “energy-momentum” tensor field Tab. Hence, a model of space-time is:
MST = 〈E, gab, Tab〉 .
The relation between these two tensor fields is given by field equations, which rep-
resent a basic physical law. The metric field specifies the geometry of space-time. The
energy-momentum field represents the potential of change (i.e. of event generation) in
space-time.
All this can be cast into in the following axioms (Romero 2014b)2.
P1− Syntactic. The set E is a C∞ differentiable, 4-dimensional, real pseudo-
Riemannian manifold.
P2− Syntactic. The metric structure of E is given by a tensor field of rank 2, gab,
in such a way that the differential distance ds between two events is:
ds2 = gabdx
adxb.
P3− Syntactic. The tangent space of E at any point is Minkowskian, i.e. its
metric is given by a symmetric tensor ηab of rank 2 and trace −2.
P4− Syntactic. The metric of E is determined by a rank 2 tensor field Tab
through the following field equations:
Gab − gabΛ = κTab, (1)
where Gab is a second rank tensor whose components are functions of the second
derivatives of the metric. Both Λ and κ are constants.
P5− Semantic. The elements of E represent physical events.
P6− Semantic. Space-time is represented by an ordered pair 〈E, gab〉:
ST=ˆ 〈E, gab〉 .
P7− Semantic. There is a non-geometrical field represented by a 2-rank tensor
field Tab on the manifold E.
P8− Semantic. A specific model of space-time is given by:
MST = 〈E, gab, Tab〉 .
So far no mention has been made of the gravitational field. The sketched theory
is purely ontological, and hence, cannot be yet identified with General Relativity. To
formulate the field equations we introduce the Einstein tensor:
Gab ≡ Rab − 1
2
Rgab, (2)
2I distinguish purely syntactic from semantic axioms. The former establish relations between symbols and
formal concepts. The latter, relations between concepts and elements of the reality.
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where Rab is the Ricci tensor formed from second derivatives of the metric and
R ≡ gabRab is the Ricci scalar. The geodesic equations for a test particle free in
the gravitational field are:
d2xa
dλ2
+ Γabc
dxb
dλ
dxc
dλ
, (3)
with λ an affine parameter and Γabc the affine connection, given by:
Γabc =
1
2
gad(∂bgcd + ∂cgbd − ∂dgbc). (4)
The affine connection is not a tensor, but can be used to build a tensor that is di-
rectly associated with the curvature of space-time: the Riemann tensor. The form of
the Riemann tensor for an affine-connected manifold can be obtained through a coor-
dinate transformation xa → x¯a that makes the affine connection to vanish everywhere,
i.e.
Γ¯abc(x¯) = 0, ∀ x¯, a, b, c. (5)
The coordinate system x¯a exists if
Γabd,c − Γabc,d + Γaec Γebd − Γade Γebc = 0 (6)
for the affine connection Γabc(x). The left hand side of Eq. (6) is the Riemann tensor:
Rabcd = Γ
a
bd,c − Γabc,d + Γaec Γebd − Γade Γebc. (7)
When Rabcd = 0 the metric is flat, since its derivatives are zero. If
K = RabcdR
bcd
a > 0 the metric has positive curvature. Sometimes it is said that the
Riemann tensor represents the gravitational field, since it only vanishes in the absence
of fields. On the contrary, the affine connection can be set locally to zero by a transfor-
mation of coordinates. This fact, however, only reflects the equivalence principle: the
gravitational field can be suppressed in any locally free falling system. In other words,
the tangent space to the manifold that represents space-time is always Minkowskian.
To determine the mathematical object of the theory that represents the gravitational
field we have to consider the weak field limit of Eqs. (1). When this is done we find
that the gravitational potential is identified with the metric coefficient g00 ≈ η00 +h00
and the coupling constant κ is −8piG/c4. If the metric represents the gravitational
potential, then the affine connection represents the strength of the field itself. This is
similar to what happens in electrodynamics, where the 4-vectorAa represents the elec-
tromagnetic potential and the tensor field F ab = ∂aAb − ∂bAa represents the strength
of the electromagnetic field. The Riemann tensor, on the other hand, being formed by
derivatives of the affine connection, represents the rate of change, both in space and
time, of the strength of the gravitational field.
The source of the gravitational field in Eqs. (1), the tensor field Tab, stands for
the physical properties of material things. It represents the energy and momentum of
all non-gravitational systems. In the case of a point mass M and assuming spherical
symmetry, the solution of Eqs. (1) represents a Schwarzschild black hole.
The Schwarzschild solution for a static mass M can be written in spherical coor-
dinates (t, r, θ, φ) as:
ds2 =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)
c2dt2 −
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)−1
dr2 − r2(dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2). (8)
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The metric given by Eq. (8) has some interesting properties. Let’s assume that the
mass M is concentrated at r = 0. There seems to be two singularities at which the
metric diverges: one at r = 0 and the other at
rS =
2GM
c2
. (9)
The length rS is known as the Schwarzschild radius of the object of mass M . Usually,
at normal densities, rS is well inside the outer radius of the physical system, and the
solution does not apply to the interior but only to the exterior of the object . For a point
mass, the Schwarzschild radius is in the vacuum region and the entire space-time has
the structure given by (8).
It is easy to see that strange things occur close to rS. For instance, for the proper
time we get:
dτ =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)1/2
dt, (10)
or
dt =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)−1/2
dτ, (11)
When r −→ ∞ both times agree, so t is interpreted as the proper time measure
from an infinite distance. As the system with proper time τ approaches to rS, dt
tends to infinity according to Eq. (11). The object never reaches the Schwarzschild
surface when seen by an infinitely distant observer. The closer the object is to the
Schwarzschild radius, the slower it moves for the external observer.
A direct consequence of the difference introduced by gravity in the local time with
respect to the time at infinity is that the radiation that escapes from a given r > rS will
be redshifted when received by a distant and static observer. Since the frequency (and
hence the energy) of the photon depend on the time interval, we can write, from Eq.
(11):
λ∞ =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)−1/2
λ. (12)
Since the redshift is:
z =
λ∞ − λ
λ
, (13)
then
1 + z =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)−1/2
, (14)
and we see that when r −→ rS the redshift becomes infinite. This means that a photon
needs infinite energy to escape from inside the region determined by rS. Events that
occur at r < rS are disconnected from the rest of the universe. The surface determined
by r = rS is an event horizon. Whatever crosses the event horizon will never return.
This is the origin of the expression “black hole”, introduced by John A. Wheeler in the
mid 1960s. The black hole is the region of space-time inside the event horizon.
According to Eq. (8), there is a divergence at r = rS. The metric coefficients,
however, can be made regular by a change of coordinates. For instance we can consider
Eddington-Finkelstein coordinates. Let us define a new radial coordinate r∗ such that
radial null rays satisfy d(ct± r∗) = 0. Using Eq. (8) we can show that:
r∗ = r +
2GM
c2
log
∣∣∣∣r − 2GM/c22GM/c2
∣∣∣∣ .
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Figure 1. Space-time diagram in Eddington-Finkelstein coordinates showing the light cones
close to and inside a black hole. Here, r = 2GM = rS is the Schwarzschild radius where
the event horizon is located (units c = 1).
Then, we introduce:
v = ct+ r∗.
The new coordinate v can be used as a time coordinate replacing t in Eq. (8). This
yields:
ds2 =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)
(c2dt2 − dr2∗)− r2dΩ2
or
ds2 =
(
1− 2GM
rc2
)
dv2 − 2drdv − r2dΩ2, (15)
where
dΩ2 = dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2.
Notice that in Eq. (15) the metric is non-singular at r = 2GM/c2. The only real
singularity is at r = 0, since there the Riemann tensor diverges. In order to plot the
space-time in a (t, r)-plane, we can introduce a new time coordinate t∗ = v − r.
From the metric (15) or from Fig. 1 we see that the line r = rS, θ =constant, and
φ = constant is a null ray, and hence, the surface at r = rS is a null surface. This null
surface is an event horizon because inside r = rS all cones have r = 0 in their future
(see Figure 1). Everything that crosses the event horizon will end at the singularity.
This is the inescapable fate for everything inside a Schwarzschild black hole. There
is no way to avoid it: in the future of every event inside the event horizon is the
singularity. However, that no signal coming from the center of the black hole can
reach a falling observer, since the singularity is always in the future, and a signal can
arrive only from the past. A falling observer will never see the singularity.
Many coordinates systems can be used to describe black holes. For this reason,
it is convenient to provide a definition of a black hole that is independent of the
choice of coordinates. First, I will introduce some preliminary useful definitions (e.g.
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Hawking & Ellis 1973, Wald 1984).
Definition. A causal curve in a space-time (M, gab) is a curve that is non
space-like, that is, piecewise either time-like or null (light-like).
We say that a given space-time (M, gab) is time-orientable if we can define over
M a smooth non-vanishing time-like vector field.
Definition. If (M, gab) is a time-orientable space-time, then ∀p ∈ M , the causal
future of p, denoted J+(p), is defined by:
J+(p) ≡ {q ∈M |∃ a future− directed causal curve from p to q} . (16)
Similarly,
Definition. If (M, gab) is a time-orientable space-time, then ∀p ∈ M , the causal
past of p, denoted J−(p), is defined by:
J−(p) ≡ {q ∈M |∃ a past− directed causal curve from p to q} . (17)
The causal future and past of any set S ⊂M are given by:
J+(S) =
⋃
p∈S
J+(p) (18)
and,
J−(S) =
⋃
p∈S
J−(p). (19)
A set S is said achronal if no two points of S are time-like related. A Cauchy
surface is an achronal surface such that every non space-like curve in M crosses it
once, and only once, S. A space-time (M, gab) is globally hyperbolic iff it admits a
space-like hypersurface S ⊂M which is a Cauchy surface for M .
Causal relations are invariant under conformal transformations of the metric. In
this way, the space-times (M, gab) and (M, g˜ab), where g˜ab = Ω2gab, with Ω a non-
zero Cr function, have the same causal structure.
Let us now consider a space-time where all null geodesics that start in a region
J− end at J +. Then, such a space-time, (M, gab), is said to contain a black hole
if M is not contained in J−(J +). In other words, there is a region from where no
null geodesic can reach the asymptotic flat3 future space-time, or, equivalently, there
is a region of M that is causally disconnected from the global future. The black hole
region, BH , of such space-time is BH = [M − J−(J +)], and the boundary of BH
in M , H = J−(J +)⋂M , is the event horizon .
Notice that a black hole is conceived as a space-time region, i.e. what characterises
the black hole is its metric and, consequently, its curvature. What is peculiar of this
space-time region is that it is causally disconnected from the rest of the space-time:
no events in this region can make any influence on events outside the region. Hence
the name of the boundary, event horizon: events inside the black hole are separated
3Asymptotic flatness is a property of the geometry of space-time which means that in appropriate coordi-
nates, the limit of the metric at infinity approaches the metric of the flat (Minkowskian) space-time.
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Figure 2. Carter-Penrose diagram of a Schwarzschild black hole.
from events in the global external future of space-time. The events in the black hole,
nonetheless, as all events, are causally determined by past events. A black hole does
not represent a breakdown of classical causality.
A useful representation of a black hole is given by a Carter-Penrose diagram.
This is a two-dimensional diagram that captures the causal relations between differ-
ent points in space-time. It is an extension of a Minkowski diagram where the ver-
tical dimension represents time, and the horizontal dimension represents space, and
slanted lines at an angle of 45◦ correspond to light rays. The biggest difference with
a Minkowski diagram (light cone) is that, locally, the metric on a Carter-Penrose di-
agram is conformally equivalent4 to the actual metric in space-time. The conformal
factor is chosen such that the entire infinite space-time is transformed into a Carter-
Penrose diagram of finite size. For spherically symmetric space-times, every point in
the diagram corresponds to a 2-sphere. In Figure 2, I show a Carter-Penrose diagram
of a Schwarzschild space-time.
From the Carter-Penrose diagram, it is clear that there is no time-like curve that
starting from the interior region of the black hole can reach the conformally flat future
infinity. All curves in this region can only end in the singularity.
Schwarzschild black holes are spherically symmetric, non-rotating objects. All
known astrophysical systems have some angular momentum. In particular, since black
holes of stellar mass are expected to result from the collapse of massive stars, they
should be rapidly rotating objects due to the momentum conservation. The metric of a
rotating mass in vacuum is the Kerr metric. For a rotating body of massM and angular
momentum per unit mass a, this metric can be written as:
ds2 = gttdt
2 + 2gtφdtdφ− gφφdφ2 − Σ∆−1dr2 − Σdθ2 (20)
4I remind that two geometries are conformally equivalent if there exists a conformal transformation (an
angle-preserving transformation) that maps one geometry to the other. More generally, two Riemannian metrics
on a manifold M are conformally equivalent if one is obtained from the other through multiplication by a
function on M .
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gtt = (c
2 − 2GMrΣ−1) (21)
gtφ = 2GMac
−2Σ−1r sin2 θ (22)
gφφ = [(r
2 + a2c−2)2 − a2c−2∆ sin2 θ]Σ−1 sin2 θ (23)
Σ ≡ r2 + a2c−2 cos2 θ (24)
∆ ≡ r2 − 2GMc−2r + a2c−2. (25)
This is the Kerr metric in Boyer-Lindquist coordinates (t, r, θ, φ). The metric
reduces to the Schwarzschild metric for a = 0. In Boyer-Lindquist coordinates the
metric is approximately Lorentzian at infinity.
The element gtφ no longer vanishes. Even at infinity this element remains (hence
I wrote approximately Lorentzian above). The Kerr parameter ac−1 has dimensions
of length. The larger the ratio of this scale to GMc−2 (the spin parameter a∗ ≡
ac/GM ), the more aspherical the metric. Schwarzschild’s black hole is the special
case of Kerr’s for a = 0. Notice that, with the adopted conventions, the angular
momentum J is related to the parameter a by:
J = Ma. (26)
Just as the Schwarzschild solution is the unique static vacuum solution of Eqs. (??)
(a result called Israel’s theorem), the Kerr metric is the unique stationary axisymmetric
vacuum solution (Carter-Robinson theorem).
The horizon, the surface which cannot be crossed outwards, is determined by the
condition grr →∞ (∆ = 0). It lies at r = routh where
routh ≡ GMc−2 + [(GMc−2)2 − a2c−2]1/2. (27)
Indeed, the track r = routh , θ = constant with dφ/dτ = a(r
2
h + a
2)−1 dt/dτ has
ds = 0 (it represents a photon circling azimuthally on the horizon, as opposed to
hovering at it). Hence the surface r = routh is tangent to the local light cone. Because
of the square root in Eq. (27), the horizon is well defined only for a∗ = ac/GM ≤ 1.
An extreme (i.e. maximally rotating) Kerr black hole has a spin parameter a∗ = 1.
Notice that for (GMc−2)2 − a2c−2 > 0 we have actually two horizons. The second,
the inner horizon, is located at:
rinnh ≡ GMc−2 − [(GMc−2)2 − a2c−2]1/2. (28)
This horizon is not seen by an external observer, but it hides the singularity to any
observer that has already crossed rh and is separated from the rest of the universe. For
a = 0, rinnh = 0 and r
out
h = rS. The case (GMc
−2)2 − a2c−2 < 0 corresponds to no
horizons and it is thought to be unphysical.
If a particle initially falls radially with no angular momentum from infinity to the
black hole, it gains angular motion during the infall. The angular velocity as seen from
a distant observer is:
Ω(r, θ) =
dφ
dt
=
(2GM/c2)ar
(r2 + a2c−2)2 − a2c−2∆ sin2 θ . (29)
A particle falling into the black hole from infinite will acquire angular velocity in
the direction of the spin of the black hole. As the black hole is approached, the particle
will find an increasing tendency to get carried away in the same sense in which the
black hole is rotating. To keep the particle stationary with respect to the distant stars,
it will be necessary to apply a force against this tendency. The closer the particle
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will be to the black hole, the stronger the force. At a point re it becomes impossible
to counteract the rotational sweeping force. The particle is in a kind of space-time
maelstrom. The surface determined by re is the static limit: from there in, you cannot
avoid to rotate. Space-time is rotating here in such a way that you cannot do anything
in order to not co-rotate with it. You can still escape from the black hole, since the outer
event horizon has not been crossed, but rotation is inescapable. The region between
the static limit and the event horizon is called the ergosphere. The ergosphere is not
spherical but its shape changes with the latitude θ. It can be determined through the
condition gtt = 0. If we consider a stationary particle, r = constant, θ = constant,
and φ = constant. Then:
c2 = gtt
(
dt
dτ
)2
. (30)
When gtt ≤ 0 this condition cannot be fulfilled, and hence a massive particle cannot
be stationary inside the surface defined by gtt = 0. For photons, since ds = cdτ = 0,
the condition is satisfied at the surface. Solving gtt = 0 we obtain the shape of the
ergosphere:
re =
GM
c2
+
1
c2
(
G2M2 − a2c2 cos2 θ)1/2 . (31)
The static limit lies outside the horizon except at the poles where both surfaces
coincide. The phenomenon of “frame dragging”’ is common to all axially symmetric
metrics with dtφ 6= 0.
An essential singularity occurs when gtt → ∞. This happens if Σ = 0. This
condition implies:
r2 + a2c−2 cos2 θ = 0. (32)
Such a condition is fulfilled only by r = 0 and θ = pi2 . This translates in Cartesian
coordinates to5:
x2 + y2 = a2c−2 and z = 0. (33)
The singularity is a ring of radius ac−1 on the equatorial plane. If a = 0, then
Schwarzschild’s point-like singularity is recovered. If a 6= 0 the singularity is not
necessarily in the future of all events at r < rinnh : the singularity can be avoided by
some geodesics.
A sketch of a Kerr black hole is shown in Figure 3.
Non-vacuum solutions of both spherically symmetric and rotating black holes ex-
ists, but since they are thought to be of no astrophysical importance, I do not discuss
them here (the interested reader can see Romero & Vila 2014 and Punsly 2001).
3. Determinism and predictability in black hole space-
times
Determinism is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the world. It is an on-
tological assumption: the assumption that all events are given. It can be traced to
Parmenides and its “what is, is” (Romero 2012). It is important to emphasise that de-
terminism does not require causality and does not imply predictability. Predictability
is a property of our theories about the world, not a property of the world itself.
The confusion between determinism and predictability can be traced to Pierre-
Simon Laplace and his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities:
5The relation with Boyer-Lindquist coordinates is x =
√
r2 + a2c−2 sin θ cosφ, y =√
r2 + a2c−2 sin θ sinφ, z = r cos θ.
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Figure 3. Sketch of a Kerr black hole, with its two horizons and the ring singulatrity.
We may regard the present state of the Universe as the effect of its
past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment
would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all
items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough
to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the
movements of the greatest bodies of the Universe and those of the tiniest
atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just
like the past would be present before its eyes.
According to Laplace, every state of the Universe is determined by a set of ini-
tial conditions and the laws of physics. Since the laws are represented by differen-
tial equations and there are theorems for the existence and uniqueness of solutions,
determinism implies predictability. Theorems apply, however, only to mathematical
objects, not to reality. The world is not mathematical, just some of our representations
of it are mathematical. The existence of solutions to some equations that represent
physical laws does not imply physical existence. Physical existence is independent of
our conceptions. Moreover, even in Newtonian space-times there are Cauchy horizons
(Earman 1986). These are hypersurfaces from where, even the in case of a complete
specification of initial data, the solutions of dynamical equations cannot predict all fu-
ture events. This arises because of the absence of an upper bound on the velocities of
moving objects in the Newtonian physics. For instance, consider the trajectory of an
object that is accelerated in such a way that its velocity becomes in effect infinite in a
finite time. This object will be disconnected from all later times.
General Relativity assumes the existence of all events represented by a manifold
(see the axiomatic system presented in Section 2.). Hence, it is a deterministic theory
from an ontological point of view. The Cauchy problem, however, cannot always be
solved in General Relativity. Cauchy horizons naturally appear in many solutions of
Einstein field equations, and in particular, in those of rotating black holes. The in-
ner horizons of both Kerr and Kerr-Newman black holes are Cauchy surfaces: it is
impossible to predict the evolution of any physical system in the interior region from
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the specification of the initial conditions over the horizon and the Einstein equations.
Although the manifold is fixed, we cannot always describe it from limited knowledge.
General relativity is an example of a physical theory that can be ontologically deter-
ministic but nonetheless epistemologically underdetermined.
I remark that the existence of singular space-time models
M singST = 〈E, gab, Tab〉
does not imply a breakdown of the ontological determinacy of the theory. Singularities,
certainly, imply a failure in the predictability, but they are not elements of space-time
itself. I will elaborate more about this in Section 7..
The fact that there exist irreversible processes in the universe implies that space-
time is globally asymmetric. The laws that constrain the space-state of physical things,
and therefore their potential to change, however, are invariant under time reversal.
Black holes might play a crucial role to link the the global structure of space-time with
the local irreversibility expressed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. I turn now
to this problem.
4. Black holes and the Second Law of Thermodynam-
ics
The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of a closed system never
decreases. If entropy is denoted by S, this law reads:
dS
dt
≥ 0. (34)
In the 1870s, Ludwig Boltzmann argued that the effect of randomly moving gas
molecules is to ensure that the entropy of a gas would increase, until it reaches its
maximum possible value. This is his famous H-theorem. Boltzmann was able to
show that macroscopic distributions of great inhomogeneity (i.e. of high order or
low entropy) are formed from relatively few microstate arrangements of molecules,
and were, consequently, relatively improbable. Since physical systems do not tend
to go into states that are less probable than the states they are in, it follows that any
system would evolve toward the macrostate that is consistent with the larger number
of microstates. The number of microstates and the entropy of the system are related
by the fundamental formula:
S = k lnW, (35)
where k = 10−23 JK−1 is Boltzmann’s constant and W is the volume of the phase-
space that corresponds to the macrostate of entropy S.
More than twenty years after the publication of Boltzmann’s fundamental papers
on kinetic theory, it was pointed out by Burbury (1894, 1895) that the source of asym-
metry in the H-theorem is the implicit assumption that the motions of the gas molecules
are independent before they collide and not afterwards. This essentially means that the
entropy increase is a consequence of the initial conditions imposed upon the state of
the system. Boltzmann’s response was:
There must then be in the universe, which is in thermal equilibrium as
a whole and therefore dead, here and there, relatively small regions of the
size of our world, which during the relatively short time of eons deviate
significantly from thermal equilibrium. Among these worlds the state
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probability increases as often as it decreases.
Boltzmann (1895).
As noted by Price (2004): “The low-entropy condition of our region seems to be
associated entirely with a low-energy condition in our past.”
The probability of the large fluctuations required for the formation of the universe
we see, on other hand, seems to be zero, as noted long ago by Eddington (1931):
“A universe containing mathematical physicists at any assigned date will be in the
state of maximum disorganisation which is not inconsistent with the existence of such
creatures.” Large fluctuations are rare (P ∼ exp−∆S); extremely large fluctuation,
basically impossible . For the whole universe, ∆S ∼ 10104 in units of k = 1. This
yields P = 0.
In 1876, a former teacher of Boltzmann and later colleague at the University of
Vienna, J. Loschmidt, noted:
Obviously, in every arbitrary system the course of events must become
retrograde when the velocities of all its elements are reversed.
Loschmidt (1876).
In modern terminology, the laws of (Hamiltonian) mechanics are such that for ev-
ery solution one can construct another solution by reversing all velocities and replacing
t by −t. Since the Boltzmann’s function H[f ] is invariant under velocity reversal, it
follows that if H[f ] decreases for the first solution, it will increase for the second.
Accordingly, the reversibility objection is that the H-theorem cannot be a general the-
orem for all mechanical evolutions of the gas. More generally, the problem goes far
beyond classical mechanics and encompasses our whole representation of the physical
world. This is because all formal representations of all fundamental laws of physics
are invariant under the operation of time reversal. Nonetheless, the evolution of all
physical processes in the universe is irreversible.
If we accept, as mentioned, that the origin of the irreversibility is not in the laws
but in the initial conditions of the laws, two additional problems emerge: 1) What were
exactly these initial conditions?, and 2) How the initial conditions, of global nature,
can enforce, at any time and any place, the observed local irreversibility?
The first problem is, in turn, related to the following one, once the cosmological
setting is taken into account: in the past, the universe was hotter and at some point
matter and radiation were in thermal equilibrium; how is this compatible with the fact
that entropy has ever been increasing according to the so-called Past Hypothesis, i.e.
entropy was at a minimum at some past time and has been increasing ever since?
The standard answer to this question invokes the expansion of the universe: as
the universe expanded, the maximum possible entropy increased with the size of the
universe, but the actual entropy was left well behind the permitted maximum. The
source of irreversibility in the Second Law of Thermodynamics is the trend of the
entropy to reach the permitted maximum. According to this view, the universe actually
began in a state of maximum entropy, but due to the expansion, it was still possible for
the entropy to continue growing.
The main problem with this line of thought is that is not true that the universe was
in a state of maximum disorder at some early time. In fact, although locally matter and
radiation might have been in thermal equilibrium, this situation occurred in a regime
were the global effects of gravity cannot be ignored (Penrose 1979). Since gravity is
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an attractive force, and the universe was extremely smooth (i.e structureless) in early
times, as indicated, for instance, by the measurements of the cosmic microwave back-
ground radiation, the gravitational field should have been quite far from equilibrium,
with very low global entropy (Penrose 1979). It seems, then, that the early universe
was globally out of the equilibrium, being the total entropy dominated by the entropy
of the gravitational field. If we denote by C2 a scalar formed out by contractions of the
Weyl tensor, the initial condition C2 ∼ 0 is required if entropy is still growing today6.
The answer to the second question posed above, namely, ‘how the Second Law
is locally enforced by the initial conditions, which are of global nature?’, seems to
require a coupling between gravitation (of global nature) and electrodynamics (of local
action). In what follows I suggest that black holes can provide the key for this coupling
(for the role of cosmological horizons in this problem see Romero & Pe´rez 2011).
The electromagnetic radiation field can be described in the terms of the 4-potential
Aµ, which in the Lorentz gauge satisfies:
∂b∂bA
a(~r, t) = 4pija(~r, t), (36)
with c = 1 and ja the 4-current. The solutionAa is a functional of the sources ja. The
retarded and advanced solutions are:
Aaret(~r, t) =
∫
Vret
ja
(
~r, t−
∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣ d3~r′ +
∫
∂Vret
ja
(
~r, t−
∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣ d3~r′,
(37)
Aaadv(~r, t) =
∫
Vadv
ja
(
~r, t+
∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣ d3~r′ +
∫
∂Vadv
ja
(
~r, t+
∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣)∣∣∣~r − ~r′∣∣∣ d3~r′.
(38)
The two functionals of ja(~r, t) are related to one another by a time reversal trans-
formation. The solution (37) is contributed by sources in the past of the space-time
point p(~r, t) and the solution (38) by sources in the future of that point. The integrals
in the second term on the right side are the surface integrals that give the contributions
from i) sources outside of V and ii) source-free radiation. If V is the causal past and
future, the surface integrals do not contribute.
The linear combinations of electromagnetic solutions are also solutions, since the
equations are linear and the Principle of Superposition holds. It is usual to consider
only the retarded potential as physical meaningful in order to estimate the electro-
magnetic field at p(~r, t): F abret = ∂
aAbret − ∂bAaret. However, there seems to be no
compelling reason for such a choice. We can adopt, for instance (in what follows I use
a simplified notation),
Aa(~r, t) =
1
2
(∫
J+
adv +
∫
J−
ret
)
dV. (39)
If the space-time is curved (RabcdRabcd 6= 0), the null cones that determine the
causal structure will not be symmetric around the point p (~r, t). In particular, the
6This is because the Weyl tensor provides a measure of the inhomogeneity of the gravitational field. See
Romero, Thomas, & Pe´rez (2012) for estimates of the gravitational entropy of black holes based in the Weyl
tensor.
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presence of event horizons can make very different the contributions from both inte-
grals.
Hawking’s black hole area theorem (Hawking 1971) ensures that in a time-
orientable space-time such that for all null vectors ka holds Rabkakb ≥ 0, the area of
the event horizons of black holes either remains the same or increases with cosmic
time. More precisely:
Theorem. Let (M, gab) be a time-orientable space-time such that Rabkakb ≥ 0
for all null ka. Let Σ1 and Σ2 be space-like Cauchy surfaces for the globally
hyperbolic region of the space-time with Σ2 ⊂ J+(Σ1), and be H1 = H
⋂
Σ1,
H2 = H
⋂
Σ2, where H denotes an event horizon. ThenH2 ≥ H1.
The fact that astrophysical black holes are always immersed in the cosmic back-
ground radiation, whose temperature is much higher than the horizon temperature,
implies that they always accrete and then, by the first law of black holes (Bardeen et
al. 1973), H2 > H1. The total area of black holes increases with cosmic time. The
accretion should include not only photons but also charged particles. This means that
the total number of charges in the past of any point p(~r, t) will be different from their
number in the corresponding future. This creates a local asymmetry that can be related
to the Second Law.
We can introduce a vector field La given by:
La =
[∫
J−
ret−
∫
J+
adv
]
dV 6= 0. (40)
If gabLaT b 6= 0, with T b = (1, 0, 0, 0) there is a preferred direction for the Poynt-
ing flux in space-time. The Poynting flux is given by:
~S = 4pi ~E × ~B = (T 01EM, T 02EM, T 03EM), (41)
where ~E and ~B are the electric and magnetic fields and T abEM is the electromagnetic
energy-momentum tensor.
In a black hole interior the direction of the Poynting flux is toward the singularity.
In an expanding, accelerating universe, it is in the global future direction. We see,
then, that a time-like vector field, in a general space-time (M, gab), can be anisotropic.
There is a global to local relation given by the Poynting flux as determined by the
curvature of space-time that indicates the direction along which events occur. Physical
processes, inside a black hole, have a different orientation from outside, and the causal
structure of the world is determined by the dynamics of space-time and the initial con-
ditions. Macroscopic irreversibility7 and time anisotropy emerge from fundamental
reversible laws.
There is an important corollary to these conclusions. Local observations about the
direction of events can provide information about global features of space-time and
the existence of horizons and singularities.
5. Time and black holes
Presentism is a metaphysical thesis about what there is. It can be expressed as (e.g.
Crisp 2003):
7Notice that the electromagnetic flux is related with the macroscopic concept of temperature through the
Stefan-Boltzmann law: L = AσSBT 4, where σSB is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant.
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Presentism. It is always the case that, for every x, x is present.
The quantification in this scheme is unrestricted, it ranges over all existents. In order
to render this definition meaningful, the presentist must provide a specification of the
term ‘present’. Crisp, in the cited paper, offers the following definition:
Present. The mereological sum of all objects with null temporal dis-
tance.
The notion of temporal distance is defined loosely, but in such a way that it accords
with common sense and the physical time interval between two events. From these
definitions it follows that the present is a thing, not a concept. The present is the
ontological aggregation of all present things. Hence, to say that ‘x is present’, actually
means “x is part of the present”.
The opposite thesis of presentism is eternalism, also called four-dimensionalism.
Eternalists subscribe the existence of past and future objects. The temporal distance
between these objects is non-zero. The name four-dimensionalism comes form the
fact that in the eternalist view, objects are extended through time, and then they have
a 4-dimensional volume, with 3 spatial dimensions and 1 time dimension. There are
different versions of eternalism. The reader is referred to Rea (2003) and references
therein for a discussion of eternalism.
I maintain that presentism is incompatible with the existence of black holes. Let
us see briefly the argument, considering, for simplicity, Schwarzschild black holes (for
details, see Romero & Pe´rez 2014).
The light cones in Schwarzschild space-time can be calculated from the metric (8)
imposing the null condition ds2 = 0. Then:
dr
dt
= ±
(
1− 2GM
r
)
, (42)
where I made c = 1. Notice that when r →∞, dr/dt→ ±1, as in Minkowski space-
time. When r → 2GM , dr/dt → 0, and light moves along the surface r = 2GM .
The horizon is therefore a null surface. For r < 2GM , the sign of the derivative is
inverted. The inward region of r = 2GM is time-like for any physical system that
has crossed the boundary surface. As we approach to the horizon from the flat space-
time region, the light cones become thinner and thinner indicating the restriction to
the possible trajectories imposed by the increasing curvature. On the inner side of the
horizon the local direction of time is ‘inverted’ in the sense that all null or time-like
trajectories have in their future the singularity at the center of the black hole.
There is a very interesting consequence of all this: an observer on the horizon will
have her present along the horizon. All events occurring on the horizon are simultane-
ous. The temporal distance from the observer at any point on the horizon to any event
occurring on the horizon is zero (the observer is on a null surface ds = 0 so the proper
time interval is necessarily zero8). If the black hole has existed during the whole his-
tory of the universe, all events on the horizon during such history (for example the
emission of photons on the horizon by infalling matter) are present to any observer
crossing the horizon. These events are certainly not all present to an observer outside
the black hole. If the outer observer is a presentist, she surely will think that some of
these events do not exist because they occurred or will occur either in the remote past
or the remote future. But if we accept that what there is cannot depend on the reference
frame adopted for the description of the events, it seems we have an argument against
8Notice that this can never occur in Minkowski space-time, since there only photons can exist on a null
surface. The black hole horizon, a null surface, can be crossed, on the contrary, by massive particles.
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presentism here. Before going further into the ontological implications, let me clarify
a few physical points.
I remark that the horizon 1) does not depend on the choice of the coordinate system
adopted to describe the black hole, 2) the horizon is an absolute null surface, in the
sense that this property is intrinsic and not frame-dependent, and 3) it is a non-singular
surface (or ‘well-behaved’, i.e. space-time is regular on the horizon).
In a world described by special relativity, the only way to cross a null surface is
by moving faster than the speed of light. As we have seen, this is not the case in a uni-
verse with black holes. We can then argue against presentism along the following lines.
Argument A1:
• P1: There are black holes in the universe.
• P2: Black holes are correctly described by General Relativity.
• P3: Black holes have closed null surfaces (horizons).
• Therefore, there are closed null surfaces in the universe.
Argument A2:
• P4: All events on a closed null surface are simultaneous with any event on the
same surface.
• P4i: All events on the closed null surface are simultaneous with the birth of the
black hole.
• P5: Some distant events are simultaneous with the birth of the black hole, but
not with other events related to the black hole.
• Therefore, there are events that are simultaneous in one reference frame, and not
in another.
Simultaneity is frame-dependent. Since what there exist cannot depend on the
reference frame we use to describe it, we conclude that there are non-simultaneous
events. Therefore, presentism is false.
Let us see which assumptions are open to criticism by the presentist.
An irreducible presentist might plainly reject P1. Although there is significant
astronomical evidence supporting the existence of black holes (e.g. Camenzind 2007,
Paredes 2009, Romero and Vila 2014), the very elusive nature of these objects still
leaves room for some speculations like gravastars and other exotic compact objects.
The price of rejecting P1, however, is very high: black holes are now a basic com-
ponent of most mechanisms that explain extreme events in astrophysics, from quasars
to the so-called gamma-ray bursts, from the formation of galaxies to the production
of jets in binary systems. The presentist rejecting black holes should reformulate the
bulk of contemporary high-energy astrophysics in terms of new mechanisms. In any
case, P1 is susceptible of empirical validation through direct imagining of the super-
massive black hole “shadow” in the center of our galaxy by sub-mm interferometric
techniques in the next decade (e.g. Falcke et al. 2011). In the meanwhile, the cumu-
lative case for the existence of black holes is overwhelming, and very few scientists
would reject them on the basis of metaphysical considerations only.
The presentist might, instead, reject P2. After all, we know that General Relativity
fails at the Planck scale. Why should it provide a correct description of black holes?
The reason is that the horizon of a black hole is quite far from the region where the
theory fails (the singularity). The distance, in the case of a Schwarzschild black hole,
is rS. For a black hole of 10 solar masses, as the one suspected to form part of the
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binary system Cygnus X-1, this means 30 km. And for the black hole in the center
of the galaxy, about 12 million km. Any theory of gravitation must yield the same
results as General Relativity at such distances. So, even if General Relativity is not the
right theory for the classical gravitational field, the correct theory should predict the
formation of black holes under the same conditions.
There is not much to do with P4, since it follows from the condition that defines
the null surface: ds = 09; similarly P4i only specifies one of the events on the null
surface. A presentist might refuse to identify ‘the present’ with a null surface. After all,
in Minkowskian space-time or even in a globally time-orientable pseudo-Riemannian
space-time the present is usually taken as the hyperplane perpendicular to the local
time. But in space-times with black holes, the horizon is not only a null surface; it is
also a surface locally normal to the time direction. In a Minkowskian space-time the
plane of the present is not coincident with a null surface. However, close to the event
horizon of a black hole, things change, as indicated by Eq. (42). As we approach
the horizon, the null surface matches the plane of the present. On the horizon, both
surfaces are exactly coincident. A presentist rejecting the identification of the present
with a closed null surface on an event horizon should abandon what is perhaps her
most cherished belief: the identification of ‘the present’ with hypersurfaces that are
normal to a local time-like direction.
The result mentioned above is not a consequence of any particular choice of co-
ordinates but an intrinsic property of a black hole horizon. This statement can be
easily proved. The symmetries of Schwarzschild space-time imply the existence of a
preferred radial function, r, which serves as an affine parameter along both null direc-
tions. The gradient of this function, ra = ∇ar satisfies (c = G = 1):
rara =
(
1− 2M
r
)
. (43)
Thus, ra is space-like for r > 2M , null for r = 2M , and time-like for r < 2M .
The 3-surface given by r = 2M is the horizon H of the black hole in Schwarzschild
space-time. From Eq. (43) it follows that rara = 0 over H , and hence H is a null
surface10.
Premise P5, perhaps, looks more promising for a last line of presentist defence.
It might be argued that events on the horizon are not simultaneous with any event in
the external universe. They are, in a very precise sense, cut off from the universe, and
9ds = cdτ = 0→ dτ = 0, where dτ is the proper temporal separation.
10An interesting case is Schwarzschild space-time in the so-called Painleve´-Gullstrand coordinates. In these
coordinates the interval reads:
ds2 = dT 2 −
(
dr +
√
2M
r
dT
)2
− r2dΩ2, (44)
with
T = t+ 4M
√2M
r
+
1
2
ln
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
2M
r
− 1√
2M
r
+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 . (45)
If a presentist makes the choice of identifying the present with the surfaces of T =constant, from Eq. (44):
ds2 = −dr2−r2dΩ2. Notice that for r = 2M this is the event horizon, which in turn, is a null surface. Hence,
with such a choice, the presentist is considering that the event horizon is the hypersurface of the present, for all
values of T . This choice of coordinates makes particularly clear that the usual presentist approach to define the
present in general relativity self-defeats her position if space-time allows for black holes.
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hence cannot be simultaneous with any distant event. Let us work out a counterexam-
ple.
The so-called long gamma-ray bursts are thought to be the result of the implosion
of a very massive and rapidly rotating star. The core of the star becomes a black hole,
which accretes material from the remaining stellar crust. This produces a growth of
the black hole mass and the ejection of matter from the magnetised central region in
the form of relativistic jets (e.g. Woosely 1993). Approximately, one of these events
occur in the universe per day. They are detected by satellites like Swift (e.g. Piran
and Fan 2007), with durations of a few tens of seconds. This is the time that takes for
the black hole to swallow the collapsing star. Let us consider a gamma-ray burst of,
say, 10 seconds. Before these 10 seconds, the black hole did not exist for a distant
observer O1. Afterwards, there is a black hole in the universe that will last more than
the life span of any human observer. Let us now consider an observer O2 collapsing
with the star. At some instant she will cross the null surface of the horizon. This will
occur within the 10 seconds that the collapse lasts for O1. But for O2 all photons
that cross the horizon are simultaneous, including those that left O1 long after the 10
seconds of the event and crossed the horizon after traveling a long way. For instance,
photons leaving the planet of O1 one million years after the gamma-ray burst, might
cross the horizon, and then can interact with O2. So, the formation of the black hole
is simultaneous with events in O1 and O2, but these very same events of O2 are
simultaneous with events that are in the distant future of O1.
The reader used to work with Schwarzschild coordinates perhaps will object that
O2 never reaches the horizon, since the approaching process takes an infinite time in
a distant reference frame. This is, however, an effect of the choice of the coordinate
system and the test-particle approximation (see, for instance, Hoyng 2006, p.116). If
the process is represented in Eddington-Finkelstein coordinates, it takes a finite time
for the whole star to disappear, as shown by the fact that the gamma-ray burst are quite
short events. Accretion/ejection processes, well-documented in active galactic nuclei
and microquasars (e.g. Mirabel et al. 1998) also show that the time taken to reach the
horizon is finite in the asymptotically flat region of space-time.
My conclusion is that black holes can be used to show that presentism provides a
defective picture of the ontological substratum of the world.
6. Black holes and information
Black holes are often invoked in philosophical (and even physical) discussions about
production and destruction of ‘information’. This mostly occurs in relation to the
possibility hypercomputing and the application of quantum field theory to the near
horizon region. I shall review both topics here.
The expression ‘hypercomputing’ refers to the actual performance of an infinite
number of operations in a finite time with the aim of calculating beyond the Turing
barrier (Turing, 1936. For a definition of a Turing machine see Hopcrof & Ullman
1979). It has been suggested that such a hypercomputation can be performed in a Kerr
space-time (Ne´meti & David 2006, Ne´meti & Handre´ka 2006). The Kerr space-time
belongs to the class of the so-called Malament-Hogarth (M-H) space-times. These are
defined as follows (Hogarth 1994):
Definition. (M, gab) is an M-H space-time if there is a future-directed time-like
half-curve γ ⊂M and a point p ∈M such that ∫
γ
dτ =∞ and γ ⊂ J−(p).
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The curve γ represents the world-line of some physical system. Because γ has
infinite proper time, it may complete an infinite number of tasks. But, at every point
in γ , it is possible to send a signal to the point p. This is because there always exists
a curve γ′ with future endpoint p which has finite proper time. We can think of γ as
the “sender” and γ′ as the “receiver” of a signal. In this way, the receiver may obtain
knowledge of the result of an infinite number of tasks in a finite time. In a Kerr space-
time this scheme can be arranged as follows. The “sender” is a spacecraft orbiting
the Kerr black hole with a computer onboard. The “receiver” is a capsule ejected by
the orbiter that falls into the black hole. As the capsule approaches the inner horizon
it intersects more and more signals from the orbiter, which emits periodically results
of the computer calculations into the black hole. By the time the capsule crosses the
inner horizon it has received all signals emitted by the computer in an infinite time
(assuming that both the black hole and the orbiter can exist forever). This would allow
the astronauts in the capsule to get answers to questions that require beyond-Turing
computation! (Ne´meti & David 2006). The whole situation is depicted in Figure 4.
There are many reasons to think that the described situation is physically impossi-
ble. I shall mention the following ones: 1) The required inner black hole structure does
not correspond to an astrophysical black hole generated by gravitational collapse. In a
real black hole the Cauchy horizon is expected to collapse into a (probably null) singu-
larity due to the backscattered gravitational wave tails that enter the black hole and are
blueshifted at the Cauchy horizon (see next section and Brady 1999). The instability
of the Cauchy horizon seems to be a quite general feature of any realistic black hole
interior model. 2) The black hole is not expected to exist during an infinite duration: it
should evaporate through Hawking radiation, over very long (but always finite) time.
3) The performance of infinite operations would require an infinite amount of energy
(Bunge 1977, Romero 2014). Even if the universe were infinite, a finite spacecraft
cannot manipulate infinite amounts of energy. 4) If signals are periodically sent to the
receiver, the blushifted electromagnetic radiation would burn the capsule by the time
it crosses the Cauchy horizon. Ne´meti & David (2006) argue that this might be cir-
cumvented by sending just one signal with the final result. This suggestion faces the
problems of the actual infinite: for any moment there will always be a further moment,
then, when the spaceship would send this signal? 5) The universe seems to be entering
into a de Sitter phase, so particle horizons will appear and block part of the accessible
space-time to the spacecraft limiting its resources.
I think that the cumulative argument is strong enough to support a hypercomputing
avoidance conjeture: the laws of physics are such that no actual hypercomputation can
be performed.
I turn now to another issue related to black holes and information: the destruction
of information by black holes. This seems to be a topic of high concern for quantum
field theorists, to the point that the presumed destruction of information in a black hole
is called the “black hole information paradox”. I maintain that such a paradox does
not exist: black holes cannot destroy any information. The reason is that information
is not a property of physical systems. It is not like the electric charge, mass, or angular
momentum. Information is an attribute of languages, and languages are constructs, i.e.
elaborated fictions. To say that black holes can destroy information is like to say that
they can destroy syntax. Let us review the situation in a bit more detail.
The application of quantum field theory to the near horizon region of a black hole
results in the prediction of thermal radiation (Hawking 1974). A temperature, then,
can be associated with the horizon:
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Figure 4. Carter-Penrose diagram of a Kerr black hole. The trajectories of two physical
systems are indicated: γ remains in the exterior space-time for an infinite amount of time,
whereas γ′ falls into the black hole. In the time it takes the latter to reach the inner hori-
zon, the former arrives to the conformal infinity. The lines that connect both trajectories
represent signals sent from γ to γ′.
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TBH =
~c3
8GMk
∼= 10−7K
(
M
M
)
. (46)
We can write the entropy of the black hole as:
S =
∫
dQ
TBH
=
kc3
4pi~G
ABH + constant ∼ 1077
(
M
M
)2
k JK−1. (47)
The area of a Schwarzschild black hole is:
ASchw = 4pir
2
Schw =
16piG2M2
c4
. (48)
In the case of a Kerr-Newman black hole, the area is:
AKN = 4pi
(
r2+ +
a2
c2
)
= 4pi
[(
GM
c2
+
1
c2
√
G2M2 −GQ2 − a2
)2
+
a2
c2
]
. (49)
Notice that expression (49) reduces to (48) for a = Q = 0.
The formation of a black holes implies a huge increase of entropy. Just to compare,
a star has an entropy ∼ 20 orders of magnitude lower than the corresponding black
hole of the same mass. This tremendous increase of entropy is related to the loss of all
the structure of the original system (e.g. a star) once the black hole is formed.
The analogy between area and entropy allows to state a set of laws for black holes
thermodynamics (Bardeen et al. 1973):
• First law (energy conservation): dM = TBHdS + Ω+dJ + ΦdQ + δM . Here,
Ω+ is the angular velocity, J the angular momentum, Q the electric charge, Φ
the electrostatic potential, and δM is the contribution to the change in the black
hole mass due to the change in the external stationary matter distribution.
• Second law (entropy never decreases): In all physical processes involving black
holes the total surface area of all the participating black holes can never decrease.
• Third law (Nernst’s law): The temperature (surface gravity) of a black black hole
cannot be zero. Since TBH = 0 with A 6= 0 for extremal charged and extremal
Kerr black holes, these are thought to be limit cases that cannot be reached in
Nature.
• Zeroth law (thermal equilibrium): The surface gravity (temperature) is constant
over the event horizon of a stationary axially symmetric black hole.
If a temperature can be associated with black holes, then they should radiate as any
other body. The luminosity of a Schwarzschild black hole is:
LBH = 4pir
2
SchwσT
4
BH ∼
16piσ~4c6
(8pi)4G2M2k4
. (50)
Here, σ is the Stephan-Boltzmann constant. This expression can be written as:
LBH = 10
−17
(
M
M
)2
erg s−1. (51)
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The lifetime of a black hole is:
τ ∼= M
dM/dt
∼ 2.5× 1063
(
M
M
)3
years. (52)
Notice that the black hole heats up as it radiates! This occurs because when the hole
radiates, its mass decreases and then according to Eq. (46) the temperature must rise.
The black hole then will lose energy and its area will decrease slowly, violating the
Second Law of Thermodynamics. However, there is no violation if we consider a
generalised second law, that always holds: In any process, the total generalised entropy
S + SBH never decreases (Bekenstein 1973).
Unfortunately, many physicists think that entropy and information are the same
thing. This confusion seems to come from J. von Neumann, who advised, not with-
out some sarcasm, Claude Shannon to adopt the expression ‘entropy’ to name the
information characterised in the mathematical theory of communications developed
by Shannon and Weaver (1949):
You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first place your un-
certainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under that name,
so it already has a name. In the second place, and more important, no-
body knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always have
the advantage.
Floridi (2010), p. 46.
Shannon’s information ‘entropy’, although formally defined by the same expres-
sion, is a much more general concept than statistical thermodynamic entropy. Informa-
tion ‘entropy’ is present whenever there are unknown quantities that can be described
only by a probability distribution. When some physicists write about a ‘Principle of
Information Conservation’ (e.g. Susskind & Lindesay 2010), what they really mean
is that the entropy of an isolated system in equilibrium should not increase, since it
already is at its maximum value. When a black hole accretes matter, however, the
entropy increases (they say that “information is destroyed”). Even if the black hole
finally radiates away the whole mass absorbed, the radiation will be thermal, so the
entropy of matter will continue to increase.
As pointed out by Penrose, these considerations do not take into account the en-
tropy of the gravitational field. The state of maximum entropy of this field is gravita-
tional collapse (Penrose 2010). As the black hole evaporates, the entropy of gravitation
decreases. Eventually, after the black hole complete evaporation, radiation will be in
thermal equilibrium and gravity in a maximally ordered state. After a huge amount
of time, the universe might return to a state of minimum overall entropy. Black holes,
in this sense, might act as some ‘entropy regeneration engines’, restoring the initial
conditions of the universe.
There is yet another sense of the so-called black hole information paradox, related
to the breakdown of predictability of quantum mechanics in presence of black holes.
The paradox here appears because of a confusion between ontological and epistemic
determinism (see Sect. 3. above). A fundamental postulate of quantum mechanics
is that complete description of a system is given by its wave function up to when
the system interacts. The evolution of the wave function is determined by a unitary
operator, and unitarity implies epistemic determinism: initial and boundary conditions
allow to solve the dynamic equation of the system and the solution is unique. If a
system is entangled and one component cross the event horizon, measurements of the
second component and knowledge of the initial state will, however, not allow to know
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the state of the component fallen into the black hole. Epistemic determinism fails for
quantum mechanics in presence of black holes. I confess not to see a problem here,
since quantum interactions are by themselves already non-unitary. Ontic determinism,
the kind that counts, is not in peril here11, and epistemic determinism was never part
of a full theory of quantum mechanics.
7. Inside black holes
We have seen that black hole space-times are singular, at least in standard General Rel-
ativity. Moreover, singularity theorems formulated by Penrose (1965) and Hawking &
Penrose (1970) show that this is an essential feature of black holes. Nevertheless,
essential or true singularities should not be interpreted as representations of physical
objects of infinite density, infinite pressure, etc. Since the singularities do not belong
to the manifold that represents space-time in General Relativity, they simply cannot
be described or represented in the framework of such a theory. General Relativity is
incomplete in the sense that it cannot provide a full description of the gravitational
behaviour of any physical system. True singularities are not within the range of values
of the bound variables of the theory: they do not belong to the ontology of a world that
can be described with 4-dimensional differential manifolds. Let us see this in more
detail (for further discussions see Earman 1995).
A space-time model is said to be singular if the manifold E is incomplete. A
manifold is incomplete if it contains at least one inextendible curve. A curve γ :
[0, a) −→ E is inextendible if there is no point p inE such that γ(s) −→ p as a −→ s,
i.e. γ has no endpoint in E. A given space-time model 〈E, gab〉 has an extension if
there is an isometric embedding θ : M −→ E′, where 〈E′, g′ab〉 is another space-time
model and θ is an application onto a proper subset ofE′. A singular space-time model
contains a curve γ that is inextendible in the sense given above. Singular space-times
are said to contain singularities, but this is an abuse of language: singularities are not
‘things’ in space-time, but a pathological feature of some solutions of the fundamental
equations of the theory.
Singularity theorems can be proved from pure geometrical properties of the
space-time model (Clarke 1993). The most important of these theorems is due to
Hawking and Penrose (1970):
Theorem. Let 〈E, gab〉 be a time-oriented space-time satisfying the following
conditions:
1. RabV aV b ≥ 0 for any non space-like V a12.
2. Time-like and null generic conditions are fulfilled.
3. There are no closed time-like curves.
4. At least one of the following conditions holds
11See Romero (2012, 2013a) on ontic determinism.
12Rab is the Ricci tensor obtained by contraction of the curvature tensor of the manifold E.
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• a. There exists a compact13 achronal set14 without edge.
• b. There exists a trapped surface.
• c. There is a p ∈ E such that the expansion of the future (or past) directed
null geodesics through p becomes negative along each of the geodesics.
Then, 〈E, gab〉 contains at least one incomplete time-like or null geodesic.
If the theorem has to be applied to the physical world, the hypothesis must be sup-
ported by empirical evidence. Condition 1 will be satisfied if the energy-momentum
T ab satisfies the so-called strong energy condition: TabV aV b ≥ −(1/2)T aa , for any
time-like vector V a. If the energy-momentum is diagonal, the strong energy condition
can be written as ρ+ 3p ≥ 0 and ρ+ p ≥ 0, with ρ the energy density and p the pres-
sure. Condition 2 requires that any time-like or null geodesic experiences a tidal force
at some point in its history. Condition 4a requires that, at least at one time, the universe
is closed and the compact slice that corresponds to such a time is not intersected more
than once by a future directed time-like curve. The trapped surfaces mentioned in 4b
refer to surfaces inside the horizons, from where congruences focus all light rays on
the singularity. Condition 4c requires that the universe is collapsing in the past or the
future.
I insist, the theorem is purely geometric, no physical law is invoked. Theorems of
this type are a consequence of the gravitational focusing of congruences.
Singularity theorems are not theorems that imply physical existence, under some
conditions, of space-time singularities. Material existence cannot be formally implied.
Existence theorems imply that under certain assumptions there are functions that sat-
isfy a given equation, or that some concepts can be formed in accordance with some
explicit syntactic rules. Theorems of this kind state the possibilities and limits of some
formal system or language. The conclusion of the theorems, although not obvious in
many occasions, are always a necessary consequence of the assumptions made.
In the case of singularity theorems of classical field theories like General Relativity,
what is implied is that under some assumptions the solutions of the equations of the
theory are defective beyond repair. The correct interpretation of these theorems is that
they point out the incompleteness of the theory: there are statements that cannot be
made within the theory. In this sense (and only in this sense), the theorems are like
Go¨del’s famous theorems of mathematical logic15.
13A space is said to be compact if whenever one takes an infinite number of ”steps” in the space, eventually
one must get arbitrarily close to some other point of the space. Thus, whereas disks and spheres are compact,
infinite lines and planes are not, nor is a disk or a sphere with a missing point. In the case of an infinite line or
plane, one can set off making equal steps in any direction without approaching any point, so that neither space
is compact. In the case of a disk or sphere with a missing point, one can move toward the missing point without
approaching any point within the space. More formally, a topological space is compact if, whenever a collection
of open sets covers the space, some sub-collection consisting only of finitely many open sets also covers the
space. A topological space is called compact if each of its open covers has a finite sub-cover. Otherwise it
is called non-compact. Compactness, when defined in this manner, often allows one to take information that
is known locally – in a neighbourhood of each point of the space – and to extend it to information that holds
globally throughout the space.
14A set of points in a space-time with no two points of the set having time-like separation.
15Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish inherent limita-
tions of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arithmetic. The first theorem states that
any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and
complete (Go¨del 1931). The second incompleteness theorem, shows that within such a system, it cannot be
demonstrated its own consistency.
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To interpret the singularity theorems as theorems about the existence of certain
space-time models is wrong. Using elementary second order logic is trivial to show
that there cannot be non-predicable objects (singularities) in the theory (Romero
2013b). If there were a non-predicable object in the theory,
(∃x)E (∀P ) ∼ Px, (53)
where the quantification over properties in unrestricted. The existential quantification
(∃x)E , on the other hand, means
(∃x)E ≡ (∃x) ∧ (x ∈ E) .
Let us call P1 the property ‘x ∈ E’. Then, formula (53) reads:
(∃x) (∀P ) (∼ Px ∧ P1x), (54)
which is a contradiction, i.e. it is false for any value of x.
I conclude that there are no singularities nor singular space-times. There is just a
theory with a restricted range of applicability.
The reification of singularities can lead to accept an incredible ontology. We read,
for instance, in a book on foundations of General Relativity:
[...] a physically realistic space-time must contain such singularities. [...]
there exist causal, inextendible geodesics which are incomplete. [...] If a
geodesic cannot be extended to a complete one (i.e. if its future endless
continuation or its past endless continuation is of finite length), then ei-
ther the particle suddenly ceases to exist or the particle suddenly springs
into existence. In either case this can only happen if space-time admits a
“singularity” at the end (or the beginning) of the history of the particle.
Kriele (1999), p. 383.
This statement and many similar ones found in the literature commit the elemen-
tary fallacy of confusing a model with the object being modelled. Space-time does not
contain singularities. Some of our space-time models are singular. It is this incom-
plete character of the theory that prompt us to go beyond General Relativity in order to
get a more comprehensive view of the gravitational phenomena. As it was very clear
to Einstein, his general theory breaks down when the gravitational field of quantum
objects starts to affect space-time.
Another interesting feature of black hole interiors is the existence, according to the
unperturbed theory, of a region with closed time-like curves (CTCs) in Kerr and Kerr-
Newman black holes. This is the region interior to the second horizon; chronology
violation is generated by the tilt of the light cones around the rotation axis in this part
of space-time (e.g. Andrka, Nie´meti, & Wu¨thrich 2008). The interior event horizon
is also a Cauchy horizon – a null hypersurface which is the boundary of the future
domain of dependence for Cauchy data of the collapse problem. It results impossible
to predict the evolution of any system inside the Cauchy horizons; they are an indica-
tion of the breaking of predictability in the theory. These horizons, however, exhibit
highly pathological behaviour; small time-dependent perturbations originating outside
the black hole undergo an infinite gravitational blueshift as they evolve towards the
horizon. This blueshift of infalling radiation gave the first indications that these so-
lutions may not describe the generic internal structure of real black holes. Simpson
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& Penrose (1973) pointed this out more than 40 years ago, and since then linear per-
turbations have been analysed in detail. Poisson & Israel (1990) showed that a scalar
curvature singularity forms along the Cauchy horizon of a charged, spherical black
hole in a simplified model. This singularity is characterised by the exponential diver-
gence of the mass function with advanced time. The key ingredient producing this
growth of curvature is the blueshifted radiation flux along the inner horizon (see also
Gnedin & Gnedin 1993 and Brady 1999 for a review). Since then, the result was gen-
eralised to Kerr black holes (e.g. Brady & Chambers 1996, Hamilton & Polhemus
2011). These, and other results about the instability of the Kerr black hole interior,
suggest that CTCs actually do not occur inside astrophysical black holes.
8. Black holes and the future of the universe
According to Eq. (52), an isolated black hole with M = 10M would have a lifetime
of more than 1066 yr. This is 56 orders of magnitude longer than the age of the uni-
verse. However, if the mass of the black hole is small, then it could evaporate within
the Hubble time. A primordial black hole, created by extremely energetic collisions
short after the Big Bang, should have a mass of at least 1015 g in order to exist to-
day. Less massive black holes must have already evaporated. What happens when a
black hole losses its mass so it cannot sustain an event horizon anymore? As the black
hole evaporates, its temperature raises. When it is cold, it radiates low energy photons.
When the temperature increases, more and more energetic particles will be emitted. At
some point gamma rays would be produced. If there is a population of primordial black
holes, their radiation should contribute to the diffuse gamma-ray background. This
background seems to be dominated by the contribution of unresolved Active Galac-
tic Nuclei and current observations indicate that if there were primordial black holes
their mass density should be less than 10−8 Ω, where Ω is the cosmological density
parameter (∼ 1). After producing gamma rays, the mini black hole would produce
leptons, quarks, and super-symmetric particles, if they exist. At the end, the black hole
would have a quantum size and the final remnant will depend on the details of how
gravity behaves at Planck scales. The final product might be a stable, microscopic
object with a mass close to the Planck mass. Such particles might contribute to the
dark matter present in the Galaxy and in other galaxies and clusters. The cross-section
of black hole relics is extremely small: 10−66 cm2 (Frolov and Novikov 1998), hence
they would be basically non-interacting particles. A different possibility, advocated by
Hawking (1974), is that, as a result of the evaporation nothing is left behind: all the
energy is radiated.
Independently of the problem of mini black hole relics, it is clear that the fate of
stellar-mass and supermassive black holes is related to fate of the whole universe. In
an ever expanding universe or in an accelerating universe as it seems to be our actual
universe, the fate of the black holes will depend on the acceleration rate. The local
physics of the black hole is related to the cosmic expansion through the cosmological
scale factor a(t) (Faraoni & Jacques 2007). A Schwarzschild black hole embedded
in a Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) universe can be represented by
a generalisation of the McVittie metric (e.g. Gao et al. 2008):
ds2 =
[
1− 2GM(t)a(t)c2r
]2
[
1 + 2GM(t)a(t)c2r
]2 c2dt2 − a(t)2 [1 + 2GM(t)a(t)c2r
]4
(dr2 + r2dΩ2). (55)
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Assuming that M(t) = M0a(t), with M0 a constant, the above metric can be
used to study the evolution of the black hole as the universe expands. If the equation
of state for the cosmic fluid is given by P = ωρc2, with ω constant, then for ω <
−1 the universe accelerates its expansion in such a way that the scale factor diverges
in a finite time. This time is known as the Big Rip. If ω = −1.5, then the Big
Rip will occur in ∼ 35 Gyr. The event horizon of the black hole and the cosmic
apparent horizon will coincide for some time t < tRip and then the inner region of the
black hole would be accesible to all observers. In case of ω > −1 the expansion will
continue during an infinite time. Black holes will become more and more isolated. As
long as their temperature be higher than that of the Cosmic Microwave Background
radiation (CMB), they will accrete photons and increase their mass. When, because of
the expansion, the CMB temperature falls below that of the black holes, they will start
to evaporate. On the very long run, all black holes will disappear. If massive particles
decay into photons on such long timescales, the final state of the universe will be that
of a dilute photon gas. Cosmic time will cease to make any sense for such a state of
the universe, since whatever exist will be on a null surface. Without time, there will
be nothing else to happen. Penrose (2010), however, has suggested that a countable
sequence of open FLRW space-times, each representing a big bang followed by an
infinite future expansion might occur, since the past conformal boundary of one copy
of FLRW space-time can be “attached” to the future conformal boundary of another,
after an appropriate conformal rescaling. Since bosons obey the laws of conformally
invariant quantum theory, they will behave in the same way in the rescaled sections
of the cyclical universe. For bosons, the boundary between different cycles is not a
boundary at all, but just a space-like surface that can be passed across like any other.
Fermions, on the other hand, remain confined to each cycle, where they are generated
and decay. Most of the fermions might be converted into radiation in black holes. If
this is correct, black holes would then be the key to the regeneration of the universe.
9. Closing remarks
In this chapter I have overviewed some philosophical problems related to black holes.
The interface between black hole physics and philosophy remains mostly unexplored,
and the list of topics I have selected is by no means exhaustive. The study of black
holes can be a very powerful tool to shed light on many other philosophical issues in
the philosophy of science and even in General Relativity. Evolving black holes, black
hole dependence of the asymptotic behaviour of space-time, the nature of inertia, the
energy of the gravitational field, quantum effects in the near horizon region, turbulent
space-time during black hole mergers, the classical characterisation of the gravitational
field, and regular black hole interiors are all physical topics that have philosophical
significance. In black holes our current representations of space, time, and gravity are
pushed to their very limits. The exploration of such limits can pave the way to new
discoveries about the world and our ways of representing it. Discoveries in science
and philosophy.
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